The state of the conflict in Ukraine according to the Institute for the Study of War. Pundits, retired generals and Ukrainian and western officials had high expectations of a decisive Ukrainian breakthrough towards the Sea of Azov. So why would it resort to an unpopular mobilisation when it can withstand anything Ukraine and its Nato allies can throw at it? Strain on Ukraine It could enter 2024 in better shape in terms of weapons, ammunition and troop experience. Russia is ramping up its war production and its army is also gaining the practical experience of war that it clearly lacked in the early stages. But if it’s a long war of attrition, as seems likely, maintaining normality is actually a strength. Russian pro-war bloggers complain that the country has refused to go into “total war” mode. So with a stable front and steady recruitment, there would seem to be little need for the Kremlin to proceed with what would be a deeply unpopular mobilisation. While some may be those who’ve already signed up, more are joining – as confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence. Putin claims to have recruited another 300,000 volunteers in 2023. By September, even some pro-Ukrainian bloggers had to admit that the much-hyped offensive was having little strategic impact. Alexander Titov/Queens University Belfast, Author provided (no reuse)īy the time I returned in August, the perception of the threat from Ukraine had completely changed. It’s a big contrast to when I visited Russia in May, when the mood was gloomy, with expectations of a new Ukrainian offensive against the backdrop of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s increasingly hysterical videos claiming that the Russian army was a complete shambles.īut this gloomy mood quickly dissipated when footage of burning Ukrainian Leopard tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles appeared in early June.ĭaily life on Russia’s home front is adapting to the war. Ukraine war: beware all the talk of 'breakthroughs' or 'gamechangers' – it's going to be a long, bloody and costly struggle In fact, the opposite is true and realists are now talking down the prospect of a Ukrainian breakthrough any time soon. Unlike in September 2022, Kyiv much-anticipated spring and summer offensives have not had the impact that many in the west had hoped for. And, in fact, it’s Ukraine that is under pressure to conscript enough troops as its counteroffensive struggles for momentum. Spreading rumours of imminent mobilisation in Russian is clearly part of Ukraine’s psychological warfare, but the more they do it without anything happening, the less credible it becomes. It warned eligible draftees to flee Russia.Īgain in September 2023, Ukrainian sources claimed a new mobilisation was planned for the day after the Russian regional elections on September 10. When this didn’t happen, Ukrainian officials continued to claim that half a million men would be mobilised in January. In December 2022, the then-defence minister Oleksii Reznikov and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov claimed that a new wave of mobilisation would begin on January 5 2023. This is partly a misinformation campaign launched by Kyiv to sow dissent in Russia. Yet there have been persistent rumours that a new mobilisation is imminent. Conscripts are not allowed to fight outside Russia, but once they have completed their one-year national service, they join the reserves and can be called on to fight.īut, despite the huge reserves that the Kremlin can call on, it’s clear that, especially in the run-up to the next presidential elections in May 2024, another round of call-ups would be very unpopular. Mobilisation, which has occurred only once in Russia before last year (in 1941), is different from the coutry’s regular conscription mechanism, which calls up about a quarter of a million men aged 18 to 30 each year (the age limit was raised from 27 to 30 in April). In response to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive which recaptured swaths of territory from Russia, Putin called up around 300,000 men – around 1% of the eligible pool of reservists. When Vladimir Putin called for a partial mobilisation in September 2022 it was a sign to ordinary Russians that – despite all the Kremlin’s denials – this was no longer a “special military operation” but a real war.
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